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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM, REGULATORY
POLITICS, AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF FINANCE
CAPITALISM IN THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY
Abstract: Since 1990, both the U.S. and Germany have substantially
reformed their corporate governance regimes as part of an emerging
paradigm of international finance capitalism increasingly dependent on
securities markets and private shareholding. Corporate governance
reform and the emergence of finance capitalism, however, presents a
double paradox. First, the development of financial markets and the
increasing importance of market relations, often linked to the
diminution of state power, have been accompanied by a substantial and
ongoing expansion of law and regulatory capacity into the private sphere
to boost shareholder protections. Second, center-left parties in both
countries took advantage of economic crises to press for pro-shareholder
reforms against center-right opposition allied with managerial elites.
This article explains these developments by analyzing reform processes
in United States and Germany over the past decade. It argues that
changing economic conditions empowered reformist state actors, and
that they have played a central and largely autonomous role in driving
the substantial institutional change underway in contemporary
capitalism. The analysis also suggests that political conflict over
corporate governance is likely to intensify, on the right and the left, as it
impinges on the basic allocation of power within corporations and thus
the political economy.
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I. INTRODUCTION: BEYOND ENRON
The collapse of the 1990s stock market bubbles in the United
States and Europe led to a wave of massive corporate finance
scandals in the United States and stock market crashes around the
world.
Corporate finance scandals, such as Enron, Global
Crossing, World Com, and Adelphia, joined by European
counterparts such as the Netherlands’ Ahold and Italy’s Parmalat,
have made securities market regulation and the internal structure
and governance of the corporation critical issues of public concern.
The spotlight on these scandals obscures the most important part
of the story: a cross-national trend towards greater legal protection
of shareholder interests within the capital markets and the
publicly traded corporate firm itself. Economic crises have
prompted corporate governance reform as part of a new paradigm
of “finance capitalism” defined by the growth of international and
domestic capital markets, the increasing importance of
sophisticated financial services, and an expanding class of private
investors.
This article explains the processes of corporate
governance reform in United States and Germany over the past
decade and how they challenge prevailing explanations of political
economic change. These cases illustrate how changing social and
economic conditions impose new demands on the state and offer
state actors opportunities to expand state capacity, develop new
instruments of state authority and power, and fashion and
implement new policies.
The regulatory framework of finance capitalism facilitates the
development and integration of securities markets and the
formation of large pools of private investment capital by
addressing fundamental problems of information and power
asymmetries within capital markets and the corporation.
Regulatory politics defines the national corporate governance
regimes that lie at the structural core of the new finance
capitalism.
Corporate governance law performs a crucial
regulatory function by ordering the power relationships,
information flows, decision-making processes, and economic
incentives within the foundational economic institution of
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modern capitalism—the corporation. As corporate governance
changes, so too does the character of contemporary capitalism.
The emergence of finance capitalism, however, presents a double
paradox. First, the development of financial markets and the
increasing importance of market relations, often linked to the
diminution of state power, have been accompanied by a
substantial and ongoing expansion of law and regulatory capacity.
The conduct of parties within the securities markets and the
internal structure of the corporate firm are increasingly
determined by law and the steady centralization of regulatory
authority at the national level.
Second, center-left parties,
historically reliant on working class support and hostile to the
interests of financial capital, pressed for pro-shareholder reforms in
the face of resistance from conservatives allied with managerial
elites. The center-left in the United States and Germany took
advantage of very different sorts of economic crisis conditions to
successfully pursue these policy agendas in distinctive ways. The
sudden and traumatic character of the post-Enron corporate
governance crisis and the neo-liberal pluralist politics in the
United States produced a rapid but relatively short-lived reform
movement. German corporate governance reform evolved in the
context of a longer-term crisis of economic performance, coupled
with EU-driven market integration, and far more coordinated
policymaking institutions. Consequently, the German reforms
were consensual, transformative, and sustained over more than a
decade.
These paradoxes challenge prevailing theoretical approaches to
corporate governance in important ways. Corporate governance
reform poses the questions of both how state actors, through law
and regulation, have come to restructured fundamental economic
relationships, and why they have done so. Neo-liberal theories
predict convergence on a more a laissez faire, market centered
economic model. This perspective fails to explain the state’s
substantially increased regulatory intervention in the economy
that has accompanied corporate governance reform. Financial
regulations and regulatory bodies exist where before there were
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none. Law restructures the internal structure and power relations
of the corporation in new and pathbreaking ways. Corporate
governance reform in the United States, as the leading “liberal
market economy,” and Germany, as the leading “coordinated
market economy” (Hall and Soskice 2001), sheds light on crossnational trends in reform processes, the role of the state in the
economy, and the relative trajectories of American and German
capitalism. Yet much recent work in contemporary comparative
political economy, particularly the “varieties of capitalism”
literature, maintains that institutional differences among national
economies are path dependent, locked into place by the
comparative economic advantages these arrangements confer on
domestic firms. (E.g., Hall and Soskice, 2001) This description
fails to explain the degree of political economic change that has
occurred in recent years and the intensely political processes that
construct corporate governance regimes.
Political elites in the United States and Germany pursued
corporate governance reform by expanding, centralizing, and
institutionalizing regulation in the interests of shareholders and
finance capital. These reforms served the interests of political
elites by using capital market pressures to constrain managerial
autonomy, shore up political economic legitimacy, increase
corporate
efficiency,
and
improve
aggregate
economic
performance. They reflect the capacity of state actors to influence
and take advantage of changing economic conditions, interest
group preferences, and public opinion by framing public policy
debates and constructing interest group alliances to overcome path
dependence. These developments contradict images of stable
political economic equilibria, associated with path dependence
theory, as well as neo-liberal predictions of state retreat. Instead,
we are seeing the emergence of varieties of finance capitalism
analogous to the varieties of post-war capitalism.
This article identifies the main trends in corporate governance
reform in the United States and Germany in historical and
political context. Part II sets out a brief sketch of the legal,
institutional, and ideological features of American and German
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corporate governance regimes prior to the 1990s. These regimes
embodied, respectively, distinctive liberal market and coordinated
market variants of post-war capitalism, and each contained
tensions and flaws that would trigger the reforms of the past
fifteen years. Part III discusses the political responses to economic
and corporate governance crises and shows how institutional
structures influenced the course and content of the American and
German corporate governance reforms since 1990.
Part IV
concludes with a political analysis of these reforms and their
implications for the developmental trajectories of the American
and German governance models.

II. THE REGULATORY STATE, PUBLIC LAW, AND THE
CORPORATE FIRM
Corporate governance regimes structure the allocation of power
among managers, shareholders, and employees— the principal
groups involved in corporate affairs.1 A tripartite legal structure of
company (or corporate) law, securities regulation, and labor
relations law defines the juridical relationships among these
groups and is a central feature of national political economies.
(Cioffi 2002a: 1-2; 2000)
The United States and Germany
represent very distinct political economic models defined by
“liberal market” and “coordinated market” institutional
arrangements,
respectively.2
(See
Tables
1
and
2)

1

Cioffi 2002a: 1; cf. Gerke 1998 (quotation omitted). This definition of the term
corporate governance goes well beyond the narrow confines of the shareholdermanager (principal-agent) relationship that preoccupies the vast majority of
scholarship in law and economics. This definition more accurately describes
the function of corporate governance and its relationship to the broader political
economy.
2
See Hall and Soskice 2001. For a classic expression of a political economic
typology in the study of national financial systems, see Zysman, 1983. An
updated analysis of national corporate governance regimes from this typological
perspective is presented in Cioffi, 2000 and Cioffi and Cohen, 1999.

TABLES 1: POST-WAR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MODELS IN THE UNITED STATES (C. 1985)

UNITED STATES

REGULATION

SECURITIES
LAW

COMPANY
LAW

LABOR LAW

ENFORCEMENT
MECHANISMS

• Centralized federal securities regulation by SEC imposes
stringent & highly prescriptive transparency & disclosure
rules.
• SEC proxy rules grant managers effective control over
nominations and elections to the board of directors.
• Self-regulation and private rulemaking in accounting industry.
• State law governs internal firm structure & affairs (no uniform
federal corporate law).
• Fiduciary duty law favors shareholders’ interests over other
stakeholders.
• Corporate law statutes & jurisprudence permits wide variety
of anti-takeover defenses.
• Law favors decentralized unions & firm-level bargaining.
• Law sharply separated from corporate law to preserve
managerial autonomy.
• Formal & litigious enforcement of complex prescriptive rules.
• Legal rules favor enforcement through private litigation.

CORRELATED PRACTICE
• Securities markets highly capitalized, substantial use of equity
finance & financial innovation, but an accompanying
fragmentation of ownership (separation of ownership & control).
• Managerial domination of the firm built into corporate structure.
• Weak oversight of accounting industry.
• Broad managerial & board discretion in running firm.
• Corporate law & intra-firm governance favors managerial
interests.
• Stakeholders receive little legal protection, creating bias in favor
of short-term financial interests.
• Fiduciary law weakened—strengthens position of managers &
limits protection of shareholders & stakeholders alike.
• Weak, fragmented unions pursue contractual “business
unionism”.
• Contractual labor relations separate from firm governance (no
codetermination).
• High incidence of litigation.
• Wealthy & politically active plaintiffs’ bar.

TABLE 2: POST-WAR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MODELS IN GERMANY (C. 1985)

GERMANY

REGULATION

SECURITIES
LAW

COMPANY
LAW

LABOR LAW

ENFORCEMENT
MECHANISMS

Correlated Practice

• Weak state (Länder) transparency and disclosure regulation.
• No federal regulation or regulator.
• Weak shareholder rights against fraud, insider trading.

• Opaque financial reporting.
• Bank-centered financial system & undeveloped securities markets.
• Concentrated stockholding & networks of ownership & control.

• Federal company law imposes uniform rules & firm structure.
• Supervisory board codetermination in large public firms.
• Board members obliged to act in “the interests of the
enterprise” (not the shareholders)

• No pro-managerial “race to the bottom”; fosters stable system of
stakeholder representation & governance.
• Employees are a core stakeholder group.
• Weak fiduciary obligations; no principle of shareholder primacy.

• Sectoral bargaining framework between centralized industrial
unions & employer associations.
• Strong employee rights and powers under works council
codetermination.
• Weak governmental enforcement; procedural & substantive
restrictions on private law suits reduces use of litigation.

• Cooperative labor relations rest on strong unions.
• Functional split between unions & works councils takes wage
issues taken out of firm governance, leaving work hours,
organization, etc. to be resolved through firm governance.
• Governance by negotiation among opposing interests (microcorporatism) within the firm.
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In each case, characteristic institutional structures and power
relations are replicated at multiple levels of the state, market, and
corporate firm. These formal arrangements are the product of
political forces and cannot be explained as flowing from economic
efficiency or functional necessity alone.
A. THE UNITED STATES: BETWEEN NEO-LIBERALISM AND THE
REGULATORY STATE
The American economy has experienced waves of wrenching crisis
and restructuring during the past thirty years. The Fordist model
of mass production relied on large integrated and oligopolistic
industrial firms, managerial autonomy from shareholders, longplanning horizons, stable sources of capital, and predictable
product cycles in predictably expanding markets. The collapse of
the Bretton Woods monetary regime, oil shocks, and stagflation
during the 1970s undermined these foundations of Fordism and
triggered
a
prolonged
period
of
economic
crisis.
Deindustrialization, erosion of domestic and export market shares,
and the collapse of organized labor heralded the end of the postwar economic order. The wave of hostile takeovers, mergers, and
acquisitions during the 1980s signaled the arrival of a new,
volatile, and financially driven form of economic organization.
Securities markets became more than simply another source of
finance; they drove corporate—and thus economic—restructuring.
The United States had a head start in the development of this new
paradigm of finance capitalism. Its securities markets were
already well developed in terms of liquidity, stock market
capitalization, and the proportion of publicly listed firms.
Underlying this economic and financial structure was a welldeveloped legal and regulatory structure dating back to its political
origins in the New Deal. The structure of American corporate
governance encouraged reliance on rapidly-shifting arm’s-length
economic relationships rather than on longer-term relational ties
among management, capital, and labor. American law embodied
the state’s relatively non-interventionist approach to the internal
affairs of the corporation that preserved an expansive private
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sphere of corporate and managerial autonomy bounded by a highly
developed framework of formal legal rights, obligations, and
regulatory rules.
This legal framework simultaneously
concentrated power in the hands of the CEO and other senior
managers and protected shareholders.
American corporate law is distinctive in that it has been the
responsibility of state, not federal, law. State company laws
function as general enabling statutes that create the bare minima
of the corporate form— limited liability, legal capacity, a board of
directors, and basic fiduciary duties and shareholder rights.
Otherwise, corporate law gives managers and directors wide
discretion in how to structure and manage the firm. American
corporate law allows managers to sit on the board of directors—
essentially supervising themselves. Federal securities regulations
have long given management control over the nomination and
election of directors. In theory, the fiduciary duties of corporate
directors and officers should counterbalance the weakness of
shareholders in corporate governance. American corporate law
provides comparatively favorable procedural mechanisms to sue
for breach of these fiduciary duties. In practice, however, the
“business judgment rule” substantially dilutes fiduciary duties by
exempting from liability those decisions taken in good faith in the
ordinary course of business.
With the rise of the regulatory state in the 1930s, the United
States pioneered modern securities regulation.
Congress
empowered the Securities and Exchange Commission—a strong,
federal regulatory agency—to ensure the efficient functioning of
national securities markets. The SEC’s mission was to make the
markets work through federal market-reinforcing disclosure
regulation. The SEC was charged with drafting and enforcing
elaborate registration, disclosure, and securities trading rules, and
with overseeing the administration of stock exchanges. Strong
transparency, disclosure, and insider trading regulations were
designed to protect minority shareholders, facilitate market
transactions, and legitimate the country’s market-driven financial
system. Within this regulatory framework, the "external" capital
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markets in the United States became among the most developed
and liquid in the world with a high proportion of publicly traded
firms and a sophisticated financial services sector.
Both labor and shareholders were hobbled by the American
corporate governance regime. American corporate governance law
wholly excluded employees, protecting managerial prerogatives
from encroachment by collective bargaining or other potential
forms of employee influence.3 Subjects such as investment,
marketing, product design, production plans, and financial
strategies are considered within the “core of entrepreneurial
control.” At the same time, federal law segmented the financial
services industry and mandated portfolio diversification,
precluding the use of concentrated equity ownership as a means of
checking of managerial power.4 The distinctive combination of
corporate law managerialism, strong transparency and disclosure
regulation under securities law, along with the legal
marginalization of labor, constitute the basic structural features of
the American corporate governance regime.
The American corporate governance regime embodies a
complementary and mutually reinforcing relationship between the
market-driven financial system and a legalistic, transparencybased regulatory regime. The weakness of shareholders within
corporate governance encouraged investors to respond to

3

See NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958); Fibreboard Paper Prods.
Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964); see also Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S.
488, 498 (1979) (quoting Fibreboard); First National Maintenance Corp. v.
NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
4
The Glass-Steagall Act severed investment banking from commercial banking
and traditional lending; the Investment Company Act of 1940 and the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 limited the size of the stakes
investment firms and funds could hold as a percentage of their own capital and
of outstanding corporate equity. Under these deliberately fragmented
ownership conditions, shareholders could not solve the collective action
problem of coordinating and compensating the monitoring of managers. See
generally See Roe, 1998, 1994, 1993b, 1991, 1990.
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management problems through exit by selling their stakes rather
than active participation through voice. (See, e.g., Roe, 1991;
Coffee, 1991; cf. Hirschman, 1970) Relatively stringent disclosure
regulation contributed to the development of highly liquid
markets that allowed shareholders to exit from ownership by
selling shares quickly.
The reliance on exit increased the
importance of and demand for prescriptive financial disclosure
regulation to protect shareholders from market failures caused by
pervasive informational asymmetries.
This governance regime contained a set of structural flaws. These
deficiencies were well known to commentators and policymakers
prior to 2000 and some earnest attempts to address them failed
politically.
First, the largely self-regulating character of an
accounting industry that had come to treat auditing as a loss
leader to sell more lucrative consulting services undermined
securities regulation that depended on disclosure of accurate
information. Second, state corporate law and SEC proxy voting
regulations under federal securities law give shareholders virtually
no power to nominate or elect representatives to the board. This
legal framework entrenched the domination of the boards of
directors by the very management who, in principle, they were
charged with overseeing.5 Third, institutional investors were not
willing or able to actively monitor management as advocated by
many
commentators,
corporate
governance
activists,
policymakers, and academic theorists. Together, these structural
defects would contribute to the systemic corporate governance
crisis that peaked in 2001-2002.

5

Into the 1990s, even as the jobs of CEO and board chair were split with
increasing frequency and larger numbers of non-managerial directors sat on
boards, CEOs and senior managers largely dominated the very institutional
body that was supposed to render them accountable to shareholders.
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B. GERMANY: THE COORDINATED MARKET MODEL AND THE
MICROCORPORATIST FIRM
The post-war German political economy and corporate governance
regime stood in sharp contrast to the neo-liberal American model.6
A bank-centered financial system, networks of corporate crossownership, and interlocking boards stabilized financial and
ownership relations within and among firms, freeing management
to strategize for long-term growth. Strong labor unions and
codetermination incorporated labor into economic and corporate
governance in ways that further encouraged long-term planning
and discouraged the pursuit of short-term financial returns.
Overarching these arrangements, institutionalized bargaining
among peak associations coordinated economic relations at the
firm, sectoral, and national levels.
The German corporate
governance law channeled multiple contending stakeholder
interests into largely self-regulating, long-term bargaining
relationships.
Until the mid-1990s, the framework of German securities and
company law was the mirror image of the American structure. In
contrast to the centralized federal securities regulation and state
level corporate law of the United States, Germany had a uniform
federal company law and fragmented securities regulation that
dispersed legal authority among the Länder (states) and eight local
self-regulating stock exchanges.
Disclosure regulations and
accounting rules were weak. Company finances remained opaque.
Moreover, the law provided few effective avenues for private
litigation to enforce shareholder rights. In place of American-style
transparency regulation, Germany’s corporate governance regime
relied on the power of large banks to monitor managers.
Germany’s bank-centered financial system defined a set of stable,
interlocking ownership and governance relationships based on
concentrated ownership, extensive cross-shareholding networks,

6

See Vagts, 1966; O’Sullivan, 2000; Roe, 1994, 1993b; Charkham, 1994.
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and long-term relational finance ties between banks and corporate
borrowers. Relational finance by banks ameliorated pressures for
maximizing short-term financial returns and encouraged long-term
adjustment and growth strategies by industrial enterprises that
could balance the competing demands of capital and labor.
Large German “universal banks” combined lending, securities
underwriting, brokerage, and trading at the core of the financial
system.
Consequently, these banks were simultaneously
important lenders to, and major shareholders in, publicly traded
firms. Further, under German law, banks wield even greater
voting power by casting the votes of many of the shares deposited
with them, if authorized by their depositor-brokerage clients.7
Bank representation on the supervisory board frequently cemented
the combination of voting power with long-term relational lender
and shareholding relationships. In theory, the banks’ status as
shareholders aligned their interests with those of other
shareholders; and the banks’ power within firm governance
presumably protected these other investors. In fact, banks did not
play the active monitoring role assumed by conventional wisdom
and the contradictory status of the banks as lenders first and
shareholders second generated conflicts of interest that law and
regulation did not police or remedy. Absent strong shareholder
protection or strong incentives for major banks to cultivate equity
finance, relatively few German firms were publicly traded and
securities markets remained far less developed than in the United
States.

7

Thus, in addition to their own equity holdings, the banks wield
disproportionate voting strength and substantial leverage when it comes to
board nominations or influencing key strategic decisions. Charkham, 1994: 3738; Vagts, 1966: 53-58. Even where German management attempts to maintain
autonomy by diversifying sources of bank debt, Deeg, 1992: p. 208, banks have
adopted a practice of designating a "lead bank" to monitor the corporation, vote
their aggregate DSVRs, and maintain supervisory board representation. Vitols,
1995: p. 6.
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Under
German
company
law,
public
corporations
(Aktiengesellschaft or “AG”) have a dual board structure in which
the supervisory board (analogous to the American board of
directors) is completely separate from the management board (a
more collegial version of the CEO and senior management of the
American firm) with no overlapping membership.
The
supervisory board (“Aufsichtsrat”) appoints and supervises the
managing board (“Vorstand”) and formulates (or at least approves)
major corporate policies and strategies. The shareholders’ meeting
(Annual General Meeting, or AGM) has the right to receive
relevant information and vote on a broad range of issues, including
mergers, acquisitions, capital increases, and major changes in
business strategies. German company law relied on the internal
corporate institutions, the board and AGM, to constrain
managerial power rather than the discipline of stock markets.
These institutional constraints were designed to protect the
interests of creditor banks and employees as important
stakeholders of the firm.
Labor codetermination, the incorporation of employees into the
firm’s governance institutions, replicated Germany’s highly
organized labor relations at the firm level. Codetermination
through strong works councils and supervisory board
representation embodied the stakeholder vision of the corporation
as an institutional and organizational entity.
(See, e.g.,
Katzenstein, 1987: Chap. 3; Wiedemann, 1980) Company and
labor relations law create microcorporatist structures that
facilitate negotiation, compromise, cooperation, and consensus
Board codetermination became
within firm governance.8

8

Supervisory board codetermination under the Codetermination Act of 1976,
perhaps the most striking feature of German company law, requires most
corporations with over 2,000 employees appoint equal number of shareholder
and employee representatives to their supervisory boards. Wiedemann, 1980:
79. Firms with 500 to 2,000 employees must set aside only one-third of the
board seats for employee representatives. Wiedemann, 1980: 80. “Montan”
codetermination, the third (and original) variant, only applies to firms in the
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enormously important as a symbol of the country’s consensusdriven “social market economy,” but its practical import has been
modest. Works council codetermination, in contrast, provides a
second and more important form employee representation in firm
governance.9 Works councils wield substantial influence within
the workplace through their ability to use information,
consultation, and codetermination rights, and through their
authority to demand compensation for economic injury to
employees caused by managerial policy decisions. Works council
codetermination has also proved beneficial to firms as a way of
cooperatively coordinating labor relations in workplaces staffed by
highly skilled and productive employees. Within this stakeholder
governance model, a “microcorporatist” firm structure (cf.
Assmann, 1990; Streeck, 1984) curtails managerial power and
incorporates and protects the interests of both capital and labor.
The stakeholder governance model underpinned and legitimated
the post-war economic order. It also facilitated the incremental
innovations in industrial production that enabled German
industry to focus on high quality and high value-added market
niches, and allowed it to pay high wages and invest heavily in skill
formation. (See Streeck, 1984, 1987, 1991, Vitols, 1991) But these
comparative advantages came at an increasingly steep price during

coal, mining, and steel sectors employing more than 1,000 workers, provides for
full parity of shareholder and employee representation. The decline of the
mining and steel sectors in Germany has reduced the importance of Montan
codetermination. For an excellent recent review of board codetermination, see
Prigge, 1998.
9
Wiedemann, 1980: 80-82. The Works Constitution Act of 1972 provides for
the election of works councils in facilities or plants of business organizations
with five or more permanent employees, but many large firms voluntarily
instituted enterprise (or Konzern) works councils covering an entire corporate
group to ensure stable and cooperative labor relations. For general discussions
of the political origins and impact of codetermination, see, e.g., Vagts, 1966: 6478; Streeck, 1984; Katzenstein, 1987: Chapter 3; Muller-Jentsch, 1995. For the
role of works councils in German labor relations, see Thelen, 1991; cf. Turner,
1991.
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the 1990s.
Export markets became increasingly unstable,
international competition stiffened, profits from traditional bank
lending declined as a result of market saturation, and German
reunification proved enormously expensive and destabilizing. (See
Streeck, 1997) Growth stagnated at less than two per cent while
unemployment soared to over ten per cent. By the early 1990s,
German politicians faced the twin problems of intensifying
pressures to reform sources of economic rigidity and potent
resistance to structural changes that might undermine Germany’s
comparative advantages and/or antagonize powerful interest
groups.

III. POLITICS AND POLICY REFORM
A. THE AMERICAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CRISIS AND THE
POLITICS OF PUNCTUATED REFORM
During the 1980s and 1990s, corporate governance became an
increasingly important and divisive policy domain in the United
States.
Yet partisan and interest group conflict blocked
substantial reform until the pressures generated by the post-Enron
corporate governance crisis of 2001-2002 briefly overcame the path
dependence and political paralysis that had characterized the
policy area. The hostile takeover wave of the 1980s focused
popular and political attention on corporate governance and
questions of managerial and financial power as managers
mobilized coalitions with organized labor and grass-roots
community groups to erect a wide variety of anti-takeover
defenses.10 Following the decline of hostile takeovers, the rise of

10

By the early 1990s, these legal changes effectively protected incumbent
managers from hostile takeovers and had largely eliminated the market for
corporate control. There continued to be an extraordinarily vibrant market for
companies—which reached its apogee during the 1990s boom and stock market
bubble. However, the overwhelming majorities of mergers and acquisitions
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institutional investors and mass shareholding gave rise to a new, if
fragmented, constituency favoring pro-shareholder reform. Over
the course of the 1990s, as evidence of flaws in the American
corporate governance regime accumulated, policy shifted between
strengthening traditional disclosure regulation and using
institutional investors as corporate monitors.
A combination of fragmented governmental institutions with
multiple veto points on policymaking, political polarization, and
the influence of interest groups hostile to reform precluded major
systemic corporate governance reforms during the 1980s and 1990s
even as problems of poor auditing, balance sheet manipulation,
excessive CEO pay, and value-destroying merger and acquisition
activity became evident.
(Cioffi, 2005)
Conflicts pitted
managerialist business and professional groups along with antiregulation politicians against shareholder groups, pension funds,
unions, regulators, and pro-regulation politicians. (Id.)
Federal corporate governance policy was caught between proshareholder and managerial forces during the 1990s and swerved
between increased protection of shareholder interests and the
preservation of managerial power and autonomy. The SEC pushed
for more shareholder protections, but also suffered noteworthy
political defeats over attempts to limit the consulting work done
by accounting firms for their auditing clients and to require the
expensing of stock options.11 At the same time, pro-shareholder

during the 1990s were friendly deals that often richly rewarded senior managers.
(See, e.g., Cioffi 2002a, chap. 4)
11
SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, a Clinton appointee, sought to prohibit
accounting firms from doing both auditing and consulting work for corporations
that presented a conflict of interest and might compromise the integrity of
audits. Accounting firms enlisted allies in Congress to fight the regulatory
proposal, which was withdrawn after members of Congress threatened to cut
the SEC’s already inadequate budget. Likewise, the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB) and the SEC under Levitt failed in an attempt to require
the expensing of stock options in corporate financial statements. Business
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groups were split between those favoring expanded disclosure and
those seeking to encourage monitoring of management by
institutional investors. The peculiar vacillations of SEC policy
during the 1990s reflected this political and ideological conflict.
In 1992, the SEC amended its proxy rules to encourage corporate
governance activism by large institutional investors by making it
easier to communicate with each other and with management.12
The 1992 proxy rule amendments used structural regulation that
altered the institutional structure of the firm to modify behavior.
In August 2000, the SEC shifted direction with the adoption of
Regulation “Fair Disclosure” (“Regulation FD”). Regulation FD
prohibited corporate managers from selectively disclosing material
information to favored analysts, financial institutions, and
institutional investors.13 The rule undermined the SEC’s own 1992
proxy reforms.
The 1992 reforms took it for granted that
institutional investors would act on behalf of all shareholders;
Regulation FD presumed they were self-interested and potentially
collusive insiders. While addressing the problem of informational
asymmetries between small investors and large institutions,
Regulation FD limited the ability of institutional investors to
pursue corporate governance activism. Transparency regulation
and structural regulation relying on institutional activism have
always been in tension. By the end of 2000, these two paradigms

lobbies, led by “new economy” technology firms dependent on options enlisted
bipartisan congressional and executive branch support to quash to the initiative.
12
The 1992 proxy rule changes appear to have encouraged greater governance
activism by institutional investors, but at the expense of transparency in
governance. Institutional investors, with some notable exceptions, preferred to
voice their concerns and criticisms to management in private communications
that would not become public. These communications thus became occasions
for managers to disclose significant information to the representative of
institutional investors and analysts associated with investment banks and
brokerages.
13
Regulation FD expressly rejected any private cause of action enabling
enforcement by shareholder litigation and thus continued the anti-litigation
trend of the 1990s. Regulation FD is a prescriptive rule without any effective
enforcement mechanism other than a (rare) SEC enforcement action.
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of corporate governance regulation and reform had collided on the
levels of politics, law, and investor relations.
The bursting of the stock market bubble in 2000, with the loss of
over $7 trillion in stock market valuation, and the post-bubble
corporate finance scandals of 2001-2002 unveiled the vast
corruption and fraud that accompanied the economic and
investment boom of the late-1990s.
The massive financial
scandals at Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, Adelphia, Tyco,
and other major corporations stoked popular resentment of
corporate and financial elites, inflaming political support for more
wide-ranging reform of the American corporate governance
regime. The most severe legitimacy crisis of the American
financial and corporate governance systems since the Great
Depression disrupted the grip of a conservative coalition that had
favored minimal regulation and blocked reform through the 1990s.
By the spring of 2002, political leaders began to fear that the
American securities markets and financial system as a whole
might collapse after the successive shocks of the terrorist attacks
of September 11, 2001 and the seemingly endless series of
corporate finance scandals and bankruptcies stretching from late2001 through 2002.
The extraordinary scope, severity, and duration of these financial
scandals undermined the legitimacy of managerial and
professional elites and their political allies who opposed
substantial corporate governance reform. The legitimacy crisis
created a rare interregnum of partisan and interest group politics.
The growing public outrage over the scandals and market losses
allowed the Democratic Party to seize the policy agenda. The
Bush administration, congressional Republicans, and the SEC,
having resisted calls for reform, lost influence over the legislative
process.
The single most striking and important feature
politics of 2001-2002 was the virtual absence of
influence and the predominance of entrepreneurial
in Congress.
Tainted by scandal, corporate

of the reform
interest group
political actors
managers and
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accounting firms remained peripheral to the legislative process. 14
Business interests were deeply divided over the reform effort. The
spiraling corporate governance crisis induced a significant number
of leading financial figures, including billionaire investor Warren
Buffett, former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker, and
Goldman Sachs CEO Henry Paulson, to publicly support
legislative and regulatory reform. In the end, even the Business
Roundtable, the preeminent lobbying group of corporate managers,
submitted to the forces of reform.
The financial services sector also was divided over the proper
extent of corporate governance reform and government regulation.
Leading investment firms understood the depth of the crisis and
had an enormous stake in ensuring that it was contained—by
regulatory reform if necessary. Financial institutions, such as
investment banks, dependent on public faith in the integrity of the
securities markets, but also privileged insiders that benefited from
the status quo, were split over the reforms. They were also
weakened politically by their implication in broader scandals,
including dishonesty and conflicts of interests in stock analysis,
manipulating initial public offerings, and aiding dishonest
corporate executives.
Large public employee and union pension funds and institutional
investor groups (such as CalPERS, TIAA-CREF, and the Council of
Institutional Investors) shifted their policy preferences
dramatically in support of increased regulatory stringency and
intervention in corporate governance. The AFL-CIO and labor
unions, because of their close connection to union pension funds
and their members’ reliance on private pension investments, were
strongly supportive of corporate governance reform and were

14

The only issue managers fought fiercely was, perhaps revealingly but not
surprisingly, the regulation and more stringent accounting treatment of stock
options—the mechanism that was supposed to align the interests of managers
and shareholders, but which became the most effective means of managerial
rent-seeking ever devised.
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instrumental in rounding up Democratic votes in Congress. In
contrast, mutual funds and corporate pension funds remained
indifferent or hostile to reform. Neither group of institutional
investors had an appreciable influence on the substance of the
reforms.
Senate Democrats drove the drafting and passage of the reform
legislation against the opposition of anti-regulation Republicans in
Congress, the White House, and the SEC. The Senate Democrats
had the temporary advantage of being in the majority and thus
were able to frame and advance the reform agenda.
The
Democrats seized upon the scandals and reform as a way to attack
the Republicans for their anti-regulation neo-liberalism while
appealing to middle class voters with their long-established vision
of a regulatory state that protected ordinary Americans from the
depredations of dishonest business elites. The looming the 2002
midterm elections were the Democrats’ leverage and political
objective. They capitalized on divisions among and within
interest groups, holding hearings and drafting a reform bill as the
scandals and the sense of financial crisis escalated through the first
half of 2002. By the late spring and early summer of 2002 the
politics of reform had taken on a life of its own. The collapse of
World Com amid allegations of a multibillion-dollar accounting
fraud finally broke Republican resistance in early July. The Bush
Administration and the Republican Congressional leadership
sought to neutralize the scandals as a potent November 2002
election issue, substantially accepting corporate governance
reform as the price. Senate Democrats pushed through the most
comprehensive corporate governance reform in the United States
since the 1930s with the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002. In the words of one Republican staffer on Capitol Hill,
“Congress didn’t pass Sarbanes-Oxley, WorldCom did.”15

15

Interviews, Washington, DC, March 2004. Interviewees inside and outside of
government unanimously agreed that the World Com collapse broke Republican
resistance to the Sarbanes bill.
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Sarbanes-Oxley imposed a host of new requirements on publicly
traded corporations, directors, corporate managers, accountants,
and attorneys. The law expanded the SEC’s authority and
mandated the drafting of a host of new regulations governing
accounting, auditing, financial disclosure, codes of ethics, risk
management, and the internal governance structures and practices
of public firms. Most prominently, Sarbanes-Oxley created the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (the PCAOB), an
entirely new private regulatory body appointed and overseen by
the SEC, to enforce a new set of prescriptive regulations governing
accounting standards and the activities of accounting firms in
auditing and consulting. The creation of the PCAOB, though a
private non-profit entity, represents the federalization of
accounting regulation, the displacement of the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) as the primary accounting
rulemaking body, and the end of the predominantly self-regulatory
character of the accounting profession.
The second path-breaking aspect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is its
intervention in the internal structure and affairs of the
corporation—the first time federal law directly encroached on the
traditional preserve of state corporation law.16 Similar to recent
German reforms (discussed below), Sarbanes-Oxley strengthened
the independence of the board and its control over external
auditing. Public firms are now required to appoint an auditing
committee comprised entirely of independent directors and at
least one member must be qualified as a financial expert. The
audit committee now has direct responsibility for the
appointment, compensation, and oversight of the outside auditors,
as well as approval of all auditor services. Auditors now must
report directly to the board audit committee, which must resolve
any disputes between management and the auditors concerning

16

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act also increased civil and criminal penalties for a host
of securities law violations, and extended the statute of limitations for security
fraud suits, but the most important provisions of the Act were directed at the
accounting industry and the structure of the corporation.
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financial reporting.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act also mandated
enhanced internal and external monitoring, and certification of
CEOs and CFOs as to the accuracy of the corporate balance sheet.
This
unprecedented—and
underreported—federalization
of
corporate law represents a sharp break with nearly two centuries
of American federalism and suggests the increased prominence of
structural regulation as a governance mechanism in the United
States.
The Sarbanes-Oxley reforms were an exercise in damage control
and the rehabilitation of systemic legitimacy (usually referred to as
“investor confidence”) motivated by political opportunism and
blame avoidance. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act reflects no elite
consensus or coherent long-term policy agenda. The political
process was a sudden, reactive, and episodic response to scandal,
popular outcry, and fears of systemic crisis. Divisive party and
interest group politics within a fragmented and veto-prone
political structure meant that the window of opportunity would
last only as long as the crisis that opened it.
Following the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, the focus of regulatory
politics moved from Congress to the SEC. In enacting the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Congress substantially expanded the
jurisdiction and powers of the SEC, but placed the agency in the
middle of intense political conflicts. These conflicts, in addition
to a series of public gaffes and political missteps, ultimately forced
However, the
SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt’s resignation.17
continuing disclosure of scandals within financial markets and

17

Pitt, President Bush’s appointee to succeed Levitt as head the SEC, had been a
prominent securities lawyer on behalf of major accounting firms in private
practice and his efforts to minimize the significance of the corporate scandals
and to limit legislative reforms were regarded as suspect and illegitimate by
reformers and, increasingly, by the public at large. The struggle over accounting
regulation and appointments to the PCAOB ultimately resulted in the
resignations of Pitt and the first Chairman of the Accounting Oversight Board,
former FBI and CIA Director William Webster who was found to have been a
director of a corporation charged with financial improprieties.
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institutions raised the profile and importance of the SEC under
Chairman William Donaldson (Pitt’s successor) to its highest level
in decades. But the rebound of SEC influence has stoked rather
than subdued political conflicts over reform.
These conflicts culminated in the battle over proposed SEC proxy
voting rules giving shareholders greater influence over board
nominations and elections. A fundamental flaw of the SarbanesOxley Act is its use of board reform to constrain managerial
misconduct without reforming the proxy voting regulations that
entrench management domination of boards of directors. In an
omission that underscores the persistant structural constraints on
the agency of state actors even under crisis conditions, Congress
had not addressed the issue of competitive board elections due to
its politically explosive nature. (Cioffi, 2005) Business elites,
largely acquiescent regarding other reforms, closed ranks against
the SEC’s threatened change in the structural basis of managerial
power. After nearly a year of bitter conflict within the SEC, a
combination of business, Bush administration, and Republican
opposition in Congress fought the proposal to a standstill. The
Republican election victory in November 2004 effectively killed
the proposed proxy voting rules—the only corporate governance
reform successfully killed since the collapse of Enron in 2001. His
political standing and support eroded, SEC Chairman Donaldson
resigned in June 2005. The post-Enron era of corporate governance
reform was over.
B. GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM: THE POLITICAL
LOGIC OF SYSTEMIC CHANGE
The German case presents corporate governance reform and the
development of finance capitalism as the object of deliberate
governmental policy and the product of sustained party and
interest groups politics. (Cioffi, 2002b) The substantial and
comprehensive transformation of the German corporate
governance regime reflects a shift in policy preferences favoring
financial modernization dating back to the Helmut Kohl’s CDUFDP government. In the early 1990s, the Kohl government’s
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policy veered sharply in favor of increased financial market
regulation that the CDU leadership accepted as the price of
European unity and the EU’s single market program to which it
was committed. But corporate governance reform would not have
gone nearly so far since the mid-1990s without substantial
domestic support among powerful interest groups.
By the early 1990s, large segments of the German political and
economic elites began to lose faith in the German corporate
governance model. By the late 1990s, they became beguiled by the
high growth and employment rates, booming stock market, and
dynamic high-tech sector in United States. Declining profit
margins caused by saturation and excessive competition in
traditional bank lending, along with increasing domestic market
penetration by British and American investment banks in financial
services, triggered a shift in business strategies and policy
preferences of most large German universal banks. (Cioffi 2002b)
By the early 1990s, large German banks began to appreciate
financial system modernization and the cultivation of new
financial services capacities as the route to higher profits, returns
to equity, and more lucrative international markets. (Cioffi 2002b;
Lütz 1996, 2000) The elements of the new business model
reinforced one another: more sophisticated market-based financial
services would boost bank profits; higher profits would increase
returns to equity; these higher returns would raise the price of
shares that could then be used to make strategic international
acquisitions that would vault German banks into the “bulge
bracket” of top international financial institutions. This shift in
business strategies altered the banks’ policy preferences and
mobilized their peak association, the powerful and well-organized
BDB, and political allies in support of securities market and
regulation reform.18 Beginning in the early 1990s, pro-EU CDU

18

The globalization of finance and financial markets also reinforced domestic
political pressures for financial and corporate governance reform as Frankfurt
sought to remain competitive in retaining and attracting domestic and
international capital.
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and neo-liberal FDP politicians, large financial institutions, and
the banking and finance center of Frankfurt overcame the
resistance of the parochial interests of the Länder governments,
Länder-based (and regulated) stock exchanges, and small firms and
banks. (See Cioffi 2002b; Lütz 1996)
Corporate managers and the leadership of organized labor were
divided over corporate governance reform and the development of
finance capitalism. Managers of many large German corporations,
such as Daimler Benz and Siemens, backed much of the reform
agenda.
These firms now had global operations and were
increasingly interested in tapping foreign credit and securities
markets that were out of reach so long as the German financial
and corporate governance model remained insular and dominated
by domestic insiders. Union leaders, including those of IG Metall,
Germany’s leading industrial union, realized that the German
economy had slipped into a structural crisis and required reform to
boost competitiveness. Despite some skepticism, labor leaders
were largely willing to accept financial system and corporate
governance reforms so long as they did not disturb
codetermination and collective bargaining arrangements, and did
not shift the costs of restructuring onto employees.19 Shareholders,
however, played virtually no political role in the reform of
securities and company law—even though these reforms were
ostensibly undertaken on their behalf. Quite simply, given
Germany’s historically undeveloped securities markets and lack of
an equity culture of mass shareholding, shareholders were too few

19

In this sense, German welfare state policy has helped facilitate reform and
corporate restructuring. The SPD government accommodated organized labor
by extending generous unemployment and early retirement pension benefits to
ease the impact of restructuring on the workforce. This helped to shore up the
support of its base constituencies and to deflect criticism of pro-finance and proshareholder policies. Germany has effectively socialized the risk and costs of
restructuring, but at increasingly enormous costs in terms of pension outlays
and structural unemployment. (See Streeck 2003)
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and too poorly organized to wield significant influence in policy
debates. Reforms were almost entirely a top-down process.
The reform of securities law and regulation became a consensual
policy among German political and economic elites, and it has
proceeded apace since the mid-1990s. The landmark Second
Financial Market Promotion Act of 1994 transformed securities
regulation and the legal and institutional foundations of German
finance.20 The Act replaced the decentralized system of state-level
exchange regulators and largely self-regulating stock exchanges
with a centralized federal regulator, German Federal Securities
Supervisory
Office
(Bundesaufsichtsamt
für
den
Wertpapierhandel, or “BAWe”). Over the remainder of the 1990s
further legislation and regulatory rulemaking steadily expanded
the agency’s powers and jurisdiction and increased the stringency
of disclosure rules and other regulatory standards.21 In April 2002,
following the election of Schröder’s SPD-Green coalition in late
1998, the process of regulatory centralization reached its peak as
the German Parliament consolidated all financial market and
services regulation, including the regulation of securities markets,
banking, and insurance, and folded the BAWe within one massive
agency,
the
German
Financial
Supervisory
Authority
(Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, “BAFin”).22

20

Second Financial Market Promotion Act (Gesetz über den Wertpapierhandel
und zur Änderung börsenrechtlicher und wertpapierrechtlicher Vorschriften,
Zweites Finanzmarktförderungsgesetz) of 26 July 1994, Federal Law Gazette,
Part I, p. 1749.
21
From late 1997 through 1998, another series of Financial Market Promotion
Laws and other legislative changes markedly expanded the agency’s role in
regulating and policing German securities markets. The BAWe came to oversee
the filing of prospectuses, the financial disclosure by public companies, insider
trading, and the reporting of voting rights and ownership stakes. It now also
supervises financial services providers, stock brokers, the stock exchanges, and
cooperates with other national securities regulators. (See Cioffi, 2002b)
22
Law on Integrated Financial Services Supervision (Gesetz über die integrierte
Finanzaufsicht (“FinDAG”)), April 22, 2002 (effective May 1, 2002).
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With this reform, Germany surpassed the United States in the
centralized administration of financial services regulation.
Consensus was far harder to find when policy debate turned to
company law reform. The CDU-CSU led coalition balked at more
substantial corporate governance reform. Corporate managers
were—and remain—both a core constituency of the center-right
Christian Democrats. They had been willing to acquiesce in
securities law reform, but, nestled within the protective network
structure of “German Inc.”, many rejected company law reforms
that would more directly reduce their autonomy from
shareholders. Opposition was particularly intense among owners
and managers of many small and medium sized firms within the
Mittelstand, often referred to as the backbone of the German
economy, who feared that further reforms would threaten family
control of firms and their stable sources of credit within the
established bank-centered financial system. The Free Democratic
Party (FDP) was hamstrung: it was part of a CDU-CSU led
coalition that declined to press for reform, but the leadership of
Germany’s sole liberal party with historically close links to major
banks, favored corporate governance reform.
The center-left Social Democratic Party took up this reform
agenda, first in opposition in the Bundestag and then as the
governing party under Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. Since the
late 1990s, the SPD has used corporate governance reform as the
centerpiece of its own policy agenda of economic modernization
and to cast the CDU-CSU conservative alliance as the defender of
insular managerial elites in an increasingly outmoded and
dysfunctional economic model.23 The SPD claimed a strategic
centrist policy position on corporate governance reform that
complemented the pursuit of financial system modernization and
internationalization by many large banks. The party sought and

23

See Cioffi 2002b; Höpner 2003. For an excellent account and analysis of the
ways in which the Schröder government sought to create a shareholding culture
in Germany during the late 1990s, see Ziegler, 2000.
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obtained the support of major financial institutions. This placed
the conservative CDU-CSU and their neo-liberal allies in the FDP
in a difficult position. They had long relied upon the support of
business and financial elites, which were now splitting over
financial market and corporate governance reform.
Schröder’s centrists were able to overcome—for a time—objections
from segments of organized labor (particularly the rank-and-file)
and traditionalist left-wing factions who were suspicious of AngloAmerican “casino capitalism.”24 In part, the centrists prevailed
because the corporate governance policy agenda appealed to longstanding ideological concerns of the German left. Both the SPD
and Green parties have opposed the traditional insularity of
Germany’s conservative and hierarchical economic elite.25
Corporate governance reform by the SPD leadership appealed to
the Greens’ ideological preferences for economic decentralization
and devolution even though this necessitated regulatory
centralization. (Cioffi, 2002b, Höpner, 2003)
In 1998, the SPD, then still in the opposition, took advantage of
shifting policy preferences among interest groups to engineer the
first major overhaul of company law since 1965. This successful
campaign played upon popular resentment of “bank power”
among core SPD constituents while casting the party as led by
business-friendly pragmatists.26 The proposed legislation put the
CDU on the defensive and forced the Kohl government to support
a compromise version of the Control and Transparency Act
(“KonTraG”), which moderated the anti-bank provisions while

24

Indeed, Schröder’s rise within the SPD and his victory in this policy debate
indicates the decline of these traditional powers within German social
democracy.
25
For an excellent account of this ideological aspect of German social
democracy in historical perspective, see Höpner 2003.
26
For a detailed discussion of the SPD’s pseudo-populist strategy to gain leftwing support for governance reform, see Cioffi 2002b.
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retaining more important governance reforms.27
The SPD
leadership claimed credit as modernizing reformers, maintained
credibility with their left wing, painted the CDU as beholden to
corporate interests, and cultivated closer relations with the
financial sector.
The KonTraG complemented the prior massive overhaul of
securities law by addressing issues of bank power, the function of
the supervisory board, auditing, share voting rights, stock options,
and litigation rules. The law sought to reduce the power of
Germany’s banks in voting shares and supervisory board
representation while strengthening their disclosure and fiduciary
obligations to shareholders.28 However, these restrictions were
acceptable to the larger financial institutions and fit with their
abandonment of the post-war relational banking model. More
than four years before the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
German law required the supervisory boards of listed firms to hire
and oversee the external auditor instead of the management
board.29

27

Corporate Control and Transparency Act (Gesetz zur Kontrolle und
Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich, “KonTraG”) of 27 April 1998, Federal
Law Gazette, Part I, p. 786 (Gesetz vom 27.4.1998, BGBl. I, S. 786 vom
30.4.1998). For a political analysis of the KonTraG, see Cioffi 2002b.
28
If the bank’s holdings in a listed firm exceed 5% of the corporation’s stock, it
can vote their own equity stakes or vote the proxy votes of the shares deposited
by its brokerage customers—but not both. The rules on the voting of shares by
banks in corporate decision making were designed to use the traditional bankcentered proxy voting system while allowing alternative mechanisms of proxy
voting to emerge (e.g., shareholders’ associations). The KonTraG also required
banks to disclose all board mandates held by their representatives, their
ownership stakes in firms, and alternative ways for their share depositors to
exercise their votes. (Seibert, 1998; Cioffi 2002b)
29
The law contains additional auditing reforms to ensure the independence and
reliability of auditors. An auditor may not audit a firm if it has earned more
than 30% of its revenues from the client over the past five years and must
change the signatory of the audit if the same person has signed the report more
than six times in ten years. The KonTraG also raised the limitation on auditor
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The KonTraG also imposed a “one share, one vote rule” that
mandates equal voting rights and abolishes voting caps among
shares of common stock, while prohibiting the voting of crossshareholding stakes above 25% (a blocking minority under
German company law) in supervisory board elections. These
provisions were designed to prevent managers and minority
shareholders from wresting control from the majority. However,
by weakening their defensive ownership structures, this new
structure of voting rights exposed some German firms to
unprecedented threats of hostile takeover—a fact underappreciated
at the time but one that would soon prove politically contentious.
Corporate governance reform took an additional leap forward in
July 2000 when the Schröder government pushed through a major
tax reform law (Steuerreform), over strenuous opposition from the
Christian Democrats, that abolished capital gains taxes on the sale
of cross-shareholdings. The reform simultaneously accomplished
three goals. First, it further cultivated support of the financial
services sector which held a large share of these crossshareholdings. Second, it provided a means to improve the
liquidity of domestic stock markets by increasing the proportion
of shares actively traded. And third, it fit within a longer-term
strategy of using capital market pressures to force firms to
restructure and improve efficiency, both by encouraging the
development of securities markets and by undermining the
ownership networks that had insulated German corporations from
takeovers. (See Holloway, 2001)
The takeover vulnerability created by the company and tax law
reforms, along with the fear instilled in managers by Vodafone’s
hostile takeover of Mannesmann in early 2000, triggered a
backlash against the further liberalization of German corporate

liability from 500,000 DM to 8 million DM for listed corporations (2 million
DM for unlisted companies). (Cioffi 2002b)
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governance.30
The growing domestic political conflict over
takeovers spilled over into the EU’s attempt to adopt Takeover
Directive that would have liberalized Europe’s market for
corporate control. German managers, unionists, conservatives,
and left-wing Social Democrats alike mobilized and blocked the
directive in the European Parliament in July 2001. This was the
first major defeat suffered by the European Commission in pursuit
of a single EU market.31 A week after the rejection of the EU
Takeover Directive, the German cabinet approved Germany’s first
takeover law, the Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act,
designed to facilitate takeovers and a market for corporate control.
32
The
The same disparate coalition mobilized against the Act.
government ultimately diffused the controversy surrounding the
Takeover Act by diluting the shareholder-centered approach to
takeover regulation in the draft law and the Bundestag passed it in
November 2001.33

30

At the time Mannesmann was taken over, prior to the enactment of the July
2000 tax reform law, corporate Germany appeared unruffled. Interviews
conducted by the author, as well as journalistic accounts, indicate that the fears
of German managers grew when they considered the cumulative takeover
vulnerability created by the KonTraG and tax reform in the absence of
alternative anti-takeover defenses. For an excellent analysis of the
Mannesmann takeover, see Höpner and Jackson, 2001.
31
For an extended discussion of the relation between the politics of German
corporate governance and the failure of the EU Takeover Directive, see Cioffi,
2002b.
32
See Braude, 2000a, 2000b; Braude and Hong, 2001, Barbier, 2001; Williamson,
2001; Wood, 2001
33
Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act (Wertpapierwerbs- und
Übernahmegesetzvom) of December 20, 2001, BGBl. 1, 2001, 3822 (effective
January 1, 2002); see also Ashurst Morris Crisp, 2002 (translation). Rather than
enshrining the primacy of shareholder interests in law, the Takeover Act obliges
both the offeror and the target’s management to disclose information
concerning the offer to either the works council or directly to the employees,
and it entitles organized labor to two representatives on the government’s
thirteen-member takeover “advisory board.”
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After these bitter political conflicts over the basic character of the
German economy and the balance of managerial, financial, and
labor power, the SPD government retrenched and adopted a
corporate governance policy that sought to maintain the balance
among contending stakeholder interests. To compensate the
unions and left-wing Social Democrats that had supported or
acquiesced in pro-shareholder reforms, codetermination legislation
passed with government support in 2001 marginally expanded the
powers of works councils and makes them somewhat easier for
employees to form. This careful balance of stakeholder power
with increased shareholder protections was displayed again as the
government appointed two successive corporate governance
commissions.34 The first, under the chairmanship of law professor
Theodor Baums, drew representatives from major interest groups
and was charged with drafting a comprehensive code of best
practices in German corporate governance.
The second
commission, the permanent Government Commission on
Corporate Governance (known as the Cromme Commission) was
also largely comprised of peak association and interest group
representatives. It adopted a Code of Best Practices and made over
150 recommendations to improve disclosure and transparency;
strengthen the role, obligations, and independence of corporate
boards; improve external auditing; and modernize corporate
finance rules. Most important was a “comply or explain” rule,

34

Much of this account is based on an interview with Theodor Baums, July 9,
2003, Frankfurt. See also Baums Commission Report (Bericht der
Regierungskommission Corporate Governance), July 10, 2001 (complete official
German version available at www.otto-schmidt.de/corporate_governance.htm,
English summary available at
http://www.shearman.com/publications/cm_pubs.html); Government
Commission of the German Corporate Governance Code (Cromme
Commission), German Corporate Governance Code, adopted February 26, 2002,
as amended May 21, 2003 (information and official German version and English
translation available at http://www.corporate-governance-code.de/indexe.html).
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since enacted by Parliament35, that requires firms to comply with
the Code of Best Practice or file a public disclosure statement
explaining its reasons for not doing so. Tellingly, the politically
explosive subject of codetermination was excluded from both
commissions’ mandates for fear of destroying consensus on all
other issues.
The SPD-Green coalition has been forced to confront the political
constraints on corporate governance reform.
The Schröder
government has been fighting an increasingly tense two-front
battle, not only against the CDU, FDP, and corporate managers,
but also against the SPD left wing and industrial unions opposed
to further liberalization of corporate governance and the neoliberal tendencies of finance capitalism. As in the American case,
political conflict intensified and reform slowed when policy began
to impinge on the basic allocation of economic power in society.
But the serious erosion of the government’s left-wing support and
sagging SPD electoral fortunes even in core strongholds forced a
retrenchment of its reform agenda.
As a result, corporate
governance reform has fallen off since 2002.

IV. THE COMPARATIVE REGULATORY POLITICS OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM
The narrative accounts of corporate governance reform detailed
above show that regulatory intervention in the structure and
operation of firms and financial markets has undergone
remarkable change since 1990. (See Tables 3 & 4) They also
highlight a number of important common structural trends in the
United States and Germany: (1) regulatory centralization and
institutionalization, (2) the displacement of self-regulation by

35

See Transparency and Disclosure Act (TraPuG ) (Gesetz zur weiteren Reform
des Aktien- und Bilanzrechts, zu Transparenz und Publizität (Transparenz- und
Publizitätsgesetz) of July 19, 2002, BGBl. I 2002, 2681.
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formal legal rules, (3) the expansion of market facilitating
disclosure and transparency regulation, and (4) the use of
structural regulation to protect shareholders by altering the
corporation’s internal form and power relations. These trends
demonstrate a significant expansion of state power in the economy
and its active reshaping of the private sphere in the age of finance
capitalism. They also underscore the decisive importance of the
state and the role of the center-left in the politics of reform.

TABLE 3: MODIFIED GOVERNANCE MODELS

AND THE

EFFECTS

OF

REFORM

IN

THE UNITED STATES (1990-2005)

UNITED STATES

SECURITIES
LAW

COMPANY
LAW

LABOR LAW

• Institutional investors’ governance role strengthened by proxy
rules deregulation (1992).
• Securities litigation reform limits shareholder fraud suits,
empowers institutional investors as “lead plaintiffs” (1995,
1998).
• Transparency regulation strengthened by Regulation FD and
other more stringent disclosure, risk management, &
certification rules (2000, 2002-2004).
• Creation of the PCAOB and assertion of greater federal
regulatory control over accounting rules (2002-present).
• Enhanced statutory civil & criminal penalties, extension of
securities fraud statute of limitations (2002).
• Increased SEC enforcement actions (2001-2005).
• Spread of state anti-takeover laws (1980s-early 1990s).
• Federal law encroaches on state corporate law by requiring
greater board independence & control over external auditing,
and empowering board to hire own professional staff (2002).
• Improved risk management & internal monitoring procedures,
certification of accounts and monitoring by CEO & CFO
(2002).
• No significant change.

TABLE 4: MODIFIED GOVERNANCE MODELS AND THE EFFECTS OF REFORM IN THE GERMANY (1990-2005)

GERMANY

SECURITIES
LAW

• Centralization and increased stringency of securities
regulation under jurisdiction of a single federal regulatory
agency.
• Creation and steady strengthening of disclosure rules.

• Increased transparency & financial reporting by public firms.
• Banks increasingly focused on securities markets & financial
services.

COMPANY
LAW

• Restructuring of supervisory board responsibilities for
auditing and risk management.
• Institution of one share-one vote rule.
• Takeover law allows some anti-takeover defenses.

• Strengthens transparency & rights of small shareholders.
• Bars golden and shares and voting caps—empowers both minority
and controlling shareholders.
• Stakeholder system of representation & governance preserved.
• Too early to tell effect; likely to be marginal.

LABOR LAW

• Works council codetermination modestly strengthened by
making election easier & expanding consultation rights.

ENFORCEMENT

• Securities regulator given formal investigative powers.
• Marginal strengthening of private litigation rules.

• Increased regulatory enforcement of securities regulation.
• No significant change in private litigation (though more suits filed
after stock market crash of 2000).

MECHANISMS
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Corporate governance reform in these very different political
economies highlights the central role of state actors in
institutional change and the restoration of systemic legitimacy.
State actors play central coordinating and policy formulation roles
in the development of institutional and regulatory structures on
which sophisticated modern markets depend. Internal division,
uncertainty, and loss of legitimacy under crisis conditions
prevented interest groups from blocking reform but also from
proposing coherent policy solutions. Shareholders were simply
too weak to drive reform politics and policymaking. These
conditions of economic crisis and uncertainty gave political actors
greater autonomy in articulating and imposing reform agendas
that made use of new regulatory approaches, mechanisms, and
institutions to engineer institutional change and regulatory
innovation.
The primary political proponents of reform in both the United
States and Germany came from the center-left—the Democratic
Party in the United States and Germany’s SPD and Green Party.
The more conservative Republicans and CDU were generally far
more resistant to pro-shareholder reforms. The logic of the
political left advancing the cause of shareholders and finance
capital appears counterintuitive, but is quite straightforward.
(Cioffi, 2002b, 2005; Höpner, 2003; Cioffi and Höpner, 2004)
Reform threatened the interests, power, and positions of
established managerial elites closely allied with conservative
parties. In both countries, conservative parties were the defenders
of the managerial elite and the corporate status quo—but
circumstances had brought the status quo into disrepute.
Crises opened strategic political avenues to reformist center-left
parties. Center-left policymakers embraced corporate governance
reform as a means of appealing to middle class voters resentful of
economic elites while claiming the banner of reform and economic
modernization. The Democratic Party in the United States took
this opportunity to attack the Republican’s anti-regulation and
pro-manager stance, while appealing to middle class voters and
investors who believed in free but fair markets. Reform was
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popular, consistent with the Democrats’ historical support for the
expansion of the regulatory state, and put the Republicans on the
defensive. In Germany, the SPD’s corporate governance reforms
satisfied left-wing and populist constituencies by targeting
managerial (and to some extent banking) elites, yet also attracted
support from the middle class, financial sector, and portions of the
managerial elite by promoting policies that promised higher
returns to savings and financial capital, more efficient capital
allocation and corporate restructuring, and increased rates of
growth and innovation.
In both the United States and Germany, governance reform fit
surprisingly well with the center-left’s ideological and
programmatic attempts to reconcile state intervention in the
economy with market economics. The Democratic Party and the
SPD have both championed the regulatory state to ameliorate
market failures and as a counterweight to concentrated corporate
and managerial power. Both have an interest in protecting private
pension assets on which the middle and working classes
increasingly depend for retirement income. The German Greens
were likewise attracted to the cause of corporate governance
reform and even more driven by the prospect of decentralizing
economic power within domestic corporate and financial
networks. Governance and securities law reform thus appealed to
the center-left’s egalitarian ideology and policy agenda. (Höpner
2003; cf. Cioffi 2002b) This is a highly simplified sketch of
complex party political dynamics. Even so, the general point
holds: corporate governance reform—a crucial institutional
foundation of finance capitalism—is largely a project of the
political left, rather than the ostensibly pro-business or neo-liberal
right.
Despite these similarities, however, the Democrats and the SPD
advanced their legislative agendas under starkly different
institutional and political conditions that yielded fundamental
differences in the process and substance of corporate governance
reform. The fragmentation of American political institutions and
interest groups makes deliberative and sustained reform programs
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difficult, if not impossible. These characteristics favor rapid
legislative responses and convulsive episodic reforms under crisis
conditions.
Consequently, the severity of the post-Enron
American corporate governance crisis triggered a sudden—and
relatively short—episode of reform politics (c. 2002-2004).
Reformist Democrats pursued a more activist regulatory agenda as
interest groups splintered under economic and political pressure
and most Republicans retreated to distance themselves from
corruption and misconduct. The reformers’ political weakness
became evident from their inability to withstand the anti-reform
backlash by a resurgent as political alliance of political
conservatives and corporate managers against reform as these
crisis conditions dissipated. In Germany, “politics as usual” is
also often characterized by policy paralysis within a political
system that demands consensus.
However, shifting policy
preferences and the centralization of representation within peak
associations, against background conditions of European economic
integration and legal harmonization, produced new interest group
alignments and party strategies that sustained corporate
governance reform for over a decade (c. 1993 to present).36
As the politics of reform differed between the United States and
Germany, so did the significance and substance of the policy
outcomes. The reforms adopted in these two country cases served
fundamentally different ends. The American reforms tended to
reinforce
the
shareholder-centered
and
market-driven
characteristics of the established American regime.
The
innovations of structural regulation were left deeply flawed and
incomplete after the defeat of the SEC attempt to reform of
shareholder voting and board elections. Though it may prove to
be a point of departure in a new developmental trajectory away

36

Commitment to European integration played an important role in promoting
financial market and corporate governance reform, but support for EU legal
harmonization and the Single Market Program did not extend to takeover and
company law reform. As shown above, domestic politics governed the outcome
of these policy debates.
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from managerialism, Sarbanes-Oxley does not represent a
fundamental
break
with
the
established
institutional
arrangements and power relations of American corporate
governance as did the New Deal reforms of the 1930s.
In contrast, the German reforms were transformative and
fundamentally altered the domestic corporate governance regime.
Financial system and corporate governance reform constitutes a
major episode of institution building and structural change that
reflects a fundamental realignment of domestic political forces.37
German elites sought to systematically restructure their financial
and company law systems in response to pressing economic
problems. American politicians had no such systemic reform
agenda and merely sought an immediate response to the political
and economic threats posed by pervasive corporate scandals. If the
American corporate governance model has remained more
resilient, it is because Germany’s had to go through a more
substantial transformation to develop the framework of law and
regulation necessary for finance capitalism.
The position of labor and employees as stakeholders the most
striking difference between the American and German corporate
governance regimes. The exclusion of employees and labor
interests from the American corporate governance was not even
discussed, let alone challenged, in the political debate over reform.
Consequently, American corporate governance reform has taken a
shareholder-centered form. In contrast, German works council
reform and the refusal of the government’s corporate governance
commissions to even address codetermination has preserved
Germany’s stakeholder model.
Indeed, these most recent
developments reflect the increased importance of firm-level
stakeholder governance as a forum for the negotiation of economic
conflict. The more consensual and coordinated policy process in
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The prospect of labor market, pension, and social welfare reforms in Germany
under the SPD’s “Agenda 2010” further reinforce the impression that the
German social market economy is now at a critical juncture.
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Germany promoted this more thoroughgoing and longer-term
systemic reform, but also required continued accommodation of
labor interests.
Germany remains a stakeholder model of
corporate governance in important ways. Finance capitalism is
not the same as shareholder capitalism.
Current political developments point to continued and
intensifying political conflict over corporate governance. The
erosion of the SPD’s base of political support due to struggles over
economic reform and economic performance herald increasing
conflict over the basic structure and character of German
capitalism.
The incorporation of pro-shareholder securities
regulation and corporate law principles poses a potential threat to
the consensual German corporate governance regime and social
market economy. These conflicts would threaten the vaunted
institutional complementarities of the German model—high-skill,
high-wage labor, and high-value added production financed by
supplies of “patient capital”—and the comparative economic
advantages they confer. Germany’s adoption of transparency
regulation and company law rules favoring shareholder interests
may sharpen conflicts among managers, shareholders, and
employees that post-war institutional arrangements ameliorated.
In the American case, the expansion of federal regulatory authority
into the traditionally non-federal areas of accounting and corporate
law has already intensified political conflict over corporate
governance policy. (Cioffi, 2005) Managers, financial institutions,
and political conservatives have already begun to attack the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and related SEC rulemaking as excessively
costly and damaging to American business. (Id.) A backlash
against corporate governance reform has gathered force. The fierce
battle over shareholder proxy voting, mounting political attacks
on other reforms, and the resignation of two successive SEC
Chairmen under political pressure indicate that the corporate
governance reforms of 2002-2004 established new points of
conflict, not a new policy consensus.
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Corporate governance reform has become a front in broader
political battles over the future of the regulatory state and political
economic change. If the 1990s was the decade of faith in financial
st
markets, the turn of the 21 century has ushered in a more sober
but also more contentious era of regulatory politics embedded in
domestic regulatory politics and legal institutions. This suggests
that finance capitalism is less likely than ever to take a single
homogenizing form and more likely to develop in nationally
distinctive forms. Corporate governance reform has redrawn the
political battle lines over regulation, corporate power, and the
future of finance capitalism in the United States and Germany.
They have not brought a lasting peace.
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